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Abstract—It is widely expected that the core of next-generation
cellular networks will be (i) based on software-defined networking
(SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV), and (ii) shared
between multiple parties, including traditional mobile operators
and content providers. Such parties are normally competing with
each other; however, they can obtain significant, mutual benefits
even from limited and defined cooperation. We study how such
a coopetition relationship influences the decisions of (i) how to
place virtual network functions on physical hardware and (ii)
how to steer traffic between them. We present an efficient, online
algorithm to make such placement and steering decisions, and
study its performance in a realistic scenario. We find that our
algorithm would allow mobile operators and content providers
to reduce their reliance on third-party vendors by 60%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several evolution trends in cellular networks are now con-
verging and combining with each other.
The first trend concerns the core network and is represented
by the emergence of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV). Today’s LTE core net-
works are based on the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) architec-
ture and built from propriety routers and middleboxes. These
include, for example, a Serving Gateway (S-GW) that manages
user handovers and billing, a Packet Data Network Gateway
(PDN-GW) that handles connectivity to external networks, and
cellular endpoints (eNodeB) that provide also encryption and
wireless channel management for the network operator. It is
important to notice that the EPC architecture already provides
a clear distinction between user- and data-plane protocols
and protocol entities, however it still uses proprietary and
expensive hardware. Thus, a natural direction [1] that next-
generation networks might take is to replace these special-
purpose boxes with smaller, more flexible middleboxes, each
implementing a network function. As envisioned in [2], such
core networks will have enough flexibility to efficiently pro-
cess traffic flows belonging to different parties, lowering the
resulting costs.
The second trend mostly concerns the access network,
and is represented by heterogeneity [3], [4]: present-day LTE
networks are already composed of different kinds of infras-
tructure, from macro base stations to femtocells; in the future,
LTE-Advanced and 5G networks will integrate multiple radio
access technologies, including Wi-Fi [5] and millimeter-wave
antennas [6]. In parallel, the traffic served by such networks
will also become increasingly heterogeneous, coming from
different applications (web browsing, real-time gaming etc.),
$$$
$
Fig. 1. A next-generation cellular network, some parts of which belong to
the blue mobile operator (square shadow), and others to the pink content
provider (round shadow). The content provider can have the traffic generated
at its own base station (the pink one at the bottom) processed at a third-party
cloud vendor (bottom, dark red line) or at servers in the mobile operator’s
core network, encircled in the blue ellipse (top, light green line), if spare
capacity is available therein.
each requiring different service levels [7] and traversing a
different chain of network functions.
The third, and perhaps most disruptive, trend is that, for a
variety of reasons, most of which are non-technical [8], [9],
content providers such as Google, Facebook or Netflix are
starting to deploy their own networks [10]. The purpose of
such networks is to serve some of the content provider demand
directly, and, by that, enhance the available capacity where
needed. Unlike the networks deployed by mobile operators,
content providers’ networks will have a spotty coverage, typi-
cally concentrated in densely populated areas. In a similar way,
content providers will not build a complete core network, but
rather rely on third-party cloud vendors, as depicted in Fig. 1.
This peculiar feature of content providers’ core networks
represents a cooperation opportunity we seek to exploit. On
one hand, mobile operators have built complete core networks
which, due to the daily fluctuations in traffic demand, are
partially unused for most of the time; on the other, content
providers are in need for that very same computational and
network capacity. Allowing content providers to use the spare
capacity available at the mobile operators’ core, as shown
by the green line in Fig. 1, provides significant benefits to
both: mobile operators can obtain further revenue form their
core networks, and content providers can save over hefty
cloud fees1. In this paper, we will focus on the infrastructure
corresponding to Virtual Network Functions (VNFs), such
1Larger content providers, having their own data centers, would not incur
in cloud fees, but rather in higher setup/maintenance costs. Also notice that
the mobile operator’s computational capacity is deployed right in the core
network, resulting in lower delays.
as commodity servers in the core network. We will study
how different cooperation levels between the mobile operator
and content provider yield a different preference of a VNF
placement.
Specifically, our contribution is threefold. First, we derive
a proper mathematical model (Section II) for the problem
described above. Second, we present an efficient, online al-
gorithm to solve this problem (Section III). In online settings,
where we need to adapt to changes in demand, our algo-
rithm tries to simultaneously minimize the number of place-
ment changes (thus leading to a small number of resource-
consuming VNF migrations) and maximize the policies sat-
isfied. Finally, we assemble a realistic network trace, using
real-life topology and demand information, and verify that
the traffic load of content providers and mobile operators is
indeed sufficiently different to make a cooperative approach
viable (Section V). We find that optimal placements can allow
mobile operators and content providers to reduce their reliance
on third-party providers by 93%. The online algorithm, on the
other hand, is able to obtain 60% reductions and scales well
for large networks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We envision a two-stage decision process that, without
loss of generality, we describe with reference to one mobile
operator and one content provider only.
In the first stage, the mobile operator makes VNF placement
and traffic steering decisions so as to serve all its demand at the
minimum possible cost, e.g., minimizing the load on servers.
It then announces to the content provider the amount of spare
CPU and memory available at each server.
In the second stage, the content provider makes its own
placing and steering decisions. Its objective is still to serve
its traffic while minimizing the total cost, and it has the
opportunity to use its own servers (if available), or servers
belonging to the mobile operator that have spare capabilities,
or servers obtained from a third-party cloud vendor.
Depending on the extent to which operators and content
providers coordinate, we can distinguish several scenarios.
In the opportunistic scenario, the operator ignores the con-
tent provider altogether, with the latter acting in a similar
way to secondary users in cognitive radio scenarios. In the
content provider-aware scenario, the mobile operator uses
historical information to further increase its revenue, e.g.,
by leaving more spare capabilities at those servers that the
content provider used more in the past. In the cooperative
scenario, operators and content providers share their demand
information and make their decisions jointly, so as to maximize
the mutual benefit: as we will see, the degree of saving is
correlated with the degree of coopetition between both parties.
Next, we present in detail the model capturing the VNF
placement process. Notice that such decisions account for
different input information (e.g., traffic demand) and are
enacted on different networks; however, we are able to use
a unified model for both.
A. Model elements and parameters
We have three main elements to capture our system model:
(i) the traffic demand, and the (virtual) network functions that
process it; (ii) the servers and the topology they form; and (iii)
how we match the two.
The policy graph: This work extends the notation of
policy chains used in previous works [11], [12] to a policy
graph due to the limited descriptiveness of the former. Future
policy requirements formulations, as envisioned by [13], [14]
are better modeled as a tree or a graph rather than a set of
policy chains, and translating the one to the other might result
in an exponential increase in the policy requirements data size.
The policy graph is a connected directed graph GD =
(VD, ED) with no loops. The vertices of the graph are VNFs.
For each such VNF f ∈ F we denote by p(f) the maximum
amount of traffic (in Mbit/sec) a single instance of this VNF
can handle. In addition, each instance of f ∈ F requires a
memory of rM (f) ∈ R
+ MBytes and a CPU computation
of rC(f) ∈ R
+ Cycles/Mbit. It is important to notice that in
our model the memory requirements are constant, regardless
of the traffic volume the specific instance processes. The
CPU requirements, on the other hand, depend on the traffic
processed by the VNF. Thus, if there are k instance of some
VNF f ∈ F , each one processing x Mbit/sec of traffic, then
the memory requirement is rm · k MByte, while the incurred
CPU load is rC(f) ·k ·x Cycles/s. For each edge in the policy
graph e ∈ ED we denote by t(e) ∈ R
+ its traffic demands
(meaning, the amount of traffic that must pass between the
2 VNFs on its endpoints). This naturally defines the traffic
volume that needs to be processed by each VNF node v ∈ VD
in the graph as the total amount of traffic that enters that VNF:
t(v) =
∑
(u,v)∈ED
t(u, v). It is important to notice that there is
no conservation of traffic demand, as some VNFs might output
less traffic than they receive (e.g., an intrusion detection system
that drops packets), while others might output more bandwidth
than they receive (e.g., a video decoder).
The network graph: The network is modeled as a
directed graph GN = (VN , EN ). Each edge corresponds to
a physical link, whose bandwidth (or capacity) is denoted
by b(e). Similarly to [1], [11], VN is comprised of two
disjoints sets: The set of servers (denoted by M) and the
set of switches (denoted by S). Only servers are capable of
running virtual machines, and therefore, can host different
VNFs. Every node u ∈ VN has a routing table that can hold up
to rT (u) ∈ R
+ rules, a memory of cM (u) ∈ R
+ MBytes, and
a CPU computation power of cC(u) ∈ R
+ Cycles/s. Naturally,
for switches s ∈ S, cM (s) = cC(s) = 0; while for servers
m ∈M , we can assume that rT (m) =∞.
Finally, we have a cost κ(m, v) we incur into when placing
an instance of VNF v at serverm. This is typically a monetary
fee, where κ(m, v) =∞ implies that one cannot place VNF v
at server m.
B. Mixed Integer Linear Program Formulation
Finding the optimal VNF placement (namely, the placement
with least cost in terms of κ) is NP-hard (proof, by reduction
to SAT, is omitted). Nevertheless, we next show how it can be
formulated as a mixed integer linear program, implying that
existing tools (e.g., CPLEX) can be used to solve it optimally
for moderate-size networks.
Variables: Our decision variables define how traf-
fic moves between physical servers. For each pair of
VNFs v1, v2 ∈ VD and pair of servers m1,m2 ∈ M we
define a real variable x(m1,m2, v1, v2), denoted the amount
of traffic between physical servers m1 and m2 that has just
been processed by VNF v1 and need to be processed by VNF
v2.
For ease of presentation, we will also use the following two
notations as auxiliary variables: y(m, v) denotes the amount
of traffic of VNF v that is processed by serverm, and n(m, v)
denotes the number of instances of VNF v, running on server
m. Specifically,
y(m, v)=
∑
l∈M,u∈F
x(l,m, u, v)−
∑
n∈M,u∈F
x(m,n, u, v),
∀m ∈M, v ∈ F (1)
where the first term in (1) is the traffic coming to server m
and meant to be processed by any instance of VNF v and the
second term is the amount of said traffic leaving serverm. The
number of V ’s instances on server m is simply n(m, v) =⌈
y(m,v)
p(v)
⌉
. Note that the instances of VNF v on server m
consume a total of n(m, v)rM (v) memory and y(m, v)rC(v)
CPU capabilities.
Constraints: To ensure the feasibility of the placement
and the flow, we define the following constraints. First, we
have to ensure the demands that are defined in the policy graph
are fully satisfied:
∑
m1,m2∈M
x(m1,m2, v1, v2) ≥ t(v1, v2),
∀(v1, v2) ∈ ED, (2)
where the left-hand side implies that the amount of all traffic
that was processed by v1 and then by v2 (on any pair of
servers) is at least as specified by the corresponding edge in
the policy graph.
The following three constraints capture the bandwidth, CPU
and memory restrictions of physical links and servers.
∑
v1,v2∈F
x(m1,m2, v1, v2) ≤ b(m1,m2),
∀m1,m2 ∈ M (3)
∑
v∈F
(y(m, v) · rC(v)) ≤ cC(m), ∀m ∈ M (4)
∑
v∈F
(n(m, v) · rM (v)) ≤ cM (m), ∀m ∈M (5)
It is important to notice that the definition of n(m, v) includes
a ceiling operator, which makes constraint (5) integral.
Finally, there is a maximum number of active (i.e., with
non-zero traffic) outgoing flows from each server:
∑
v1,v2∈F ,l∈M
1[x(m,l,v1,v2)>0] ≤ rT (s), ∀s ∈ S (6)
We can model switches as servers with zero capabilities;
hence, (6) enables us to account for the limited capacity of
the forwarding tables at switches [1], [11].
Objective: The objective function is explicitly defined
by the cost matrix κ:
min
∑
m∈M
∑
v∈F
κm,v · n(m, v). (7)
III. ONLINE ALGORITHM
As our placement problem is NP-hard, it is not expected to
scale for large networks and frequent changes in demand (each
such change requires solving the optimization problem from
scratch). Moreover, as Section II deals with one-shot solution
to the problem, it does not take into account the number
of VNF migrations occurring if two subsequent solutions
significantly differ in their VNF placement.
Algorithm 1 is an online algorithm that addresses both issue.
It starts with an initial solution x¯, as defined in Section II.
This initial solution may be obtained by solving the MILP
one-off, or even by some heuristic placement provided by the
user. As the traffic evolves over time, the algorithm adapts the
placement and traffic steering variables. We have a threshold
parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5; the algorithm will try to free up
servers with load higher than 1 − α, and shut down servers
with load lower than α.
Algorithm 1 Our online algorithm.
Require: current load t, initial decisions x¯
⊲ We use also the auxiliary variables y¯, n¯
1: compute λ(v) as defined in (8)
2: while maxv∈F λ(v) > 1− α do
3: v⋆← argmaxv∈F λ(v)
4: x˜← solve LP relaxation (2)–(7),(9)–(10)
5: if there is no feasible solution then
6: Find a new optimal placement using the MILP.
7: else
8: m⋆← argmaxm∈M
(
y˜(m, v⋆)− y¯(m, v⋆)
)
9: n¯(m⋆, v⋆)←n¯(m⋆, v⋆)+1
10: re-balance y¯ using (11)
11: update x¯, λ
12: while minv∈F λ(v) < α do
13: v⋆← argminv∈F λ(v)
14: x˜← solve LP relaxation of problem (2)–(7),(12)
15: m⋆← argminm∈M
(
y¯(m, v⋆)− y˜(m, v⋆)
)
16: n¯(m⋆, v⋆)←n¯(m⋆, v⋆)−1
17: re-balance y¯ using (11)
18: update x¯, λ
19: return x¯
In Line 1, we compute the following parameter λ that
captures how much spare capacity we have on all servers
running instances of a VNF v:
λ(v) =
∑
u∈F t(u, v)∑
m∈Mmin
(
p(v)n(m, v), φ(m,v)
rC(v)
) , (8)
where φ(m, v) = cC(m)−
∑
u6=v y¯(m,u)rC(u) is the amount
of CPU available at server m for instances of VNF v.
Specifically, λ(v) is the ratio between the total amount of
traffic that currently needs to be processed by instances of
VNF v and the total amount of traffic that existing instances
of v can tackle. The minimum in the summation at the
denominator reflect situations where a very loaded server
cannot provide CPU of p(v) cycles/second for all VNF v’s
instances that are currently running on it.
Line 2 checks if there are VNFs that require scaling out,
i.e., for which the λ-value exceeds 1 − α: if such VNFs do
exist, we will provision additional instance(s) for it.
If we do decide to take action, then we start by deploying
an additional instance of the VNF with the highest λ-value
(Line 3). To choose which server to deploy the instance at,
we solve an LP relaxation of the problem in Section II with
objective (7), integrated with the following constraints:
y˜(m, v) >
(
n¯(m, v)− 1
)
· p(v), ∀m ∈ M, v ∈ F . (9)
y˜(m, v) ≤ n¯(m, v) · p(v),
∀m ∈ M, v ∈ F : rM (v) +
∑
u∈F
n¯(m,u)rM (u) > cM (m).
(10)
Constraint (9) ensures that the relaxed solution is a superset
of the original solution, and not a completely different one;
this allows us to limit the number of changes to the network.
Constraint (10) ensures we do not assign additional instances
of VNF v to servers that cannot possibly host another instance
of v due to memory constraints.
Assuming that we have a relaxed solution y˜(m, v) (Line 4),
we use that solution to choose a server m⋆. We select the
server that maximizes y˜(m, v⋆) − y¯(m, v⋆), i.e., intuitively,
where the relaxed solution suggested that more traffic should
be handled. In Line 9, we deploy an extra instance of VNF v⋆
at m⋆. Finally, we again use the relaxed solution to re-balance
the traffic across the instances proportionally to to the y˜ values
given by the relaxed solution:
y¯(m, v) = t(v)
y˜(m, v)∑
m′∈M y˜(m
′, v)
(11)
When there are no more VNFs with load λ(v) greater
than 1− α, we move to Line 12, and start looking for VNFs
with a small load, lower than α. Turning off some instances
of these VNFs will reduce costs, without impairing our ability
to serve all traffic. More exactly, in Line 13 we select the
VNF with the lowest λ-value, and in Line 14 we solve an
LP-relaxed problem to select the server at which to switch the
instance off. Similar to Line 4, we use an additional restriction
which is a following modified version of (9), imposing that
the relaxed solution is a subset of the original one:
y˜(m, v) ≤ n¯(m, v) · p(v), ∀m ∈M, v ∈ F . (12)
In Line 15 we use the difference between the current and
relaxed y-values to select the server m⋆, remove an instance
of VNF v⋆ from there (Line 16), and again re-balance the y
values (using (11)) and update λ-values (Line 18).
When we exit the loop, there are neither overloaded nor
underloaded VNFs, and the algorithm terminates. The calcu-
lated x¯, y¯ are then sent to the Traffic Steering Module and
the Server Manager accordingly which change the placement
and routing rules on the network itself. The algorithm will
be invoked again when the values measured by the Traffic
Monitor indicates an increase or decrease in the traffic in the
network.
Notice that Line 4 might fail to produce a relaxed solution,
due to a failure to meet the constraints (9) and (10). This
means that the current placement cannot be adapted to meet
the new demands. Thus, we are foced to compute the initial
decisions x¯, y¯ afresh by solving the full MILP problem,
obtaining a new optimal solution.
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Fig. 2. The construction of our reference scenario.
IV. REFERENCE SCENARIO
Our reference scenario includes one mobile network oper-
ator and one content provider. We build it leveraging three
sources:
• the location of the base stations of two European mobile
network operators, presented in [15];
• census data from the same country [17];
• a measurement paper [16], presenting the temporal evo-
lution of both the global mobile traffic and the mobile
traffic from specific websites and services.
It is worth stressing that all the information we use is public
and/or published. Fig. 2 summarizes how we process our data.
The full dataset of [15] includes demand (voice and data)
and deployment (location, technology power class) informa-
tion about a total around 5,000 base stations serving several
thousands users, over a period of two weeks.
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Fig. 3. The policy graph we use in our test scenario. Boxes correspond to
entry points, ellipses to VNFs that the traffic has to traverse. The values on the
edges is the amount of data transmitted between the VNFs on their endpoints.
Network operator infrastructure: The base stations of
the mobile network operator are simply the base stations of
the largest operator of our trace. The demand they serve
is constructed in such a way that (i) its temporal evolution
conforms to the one reported in [16] and (ii) the demand at
each base station is proportional to the population it covers.
As for the core network, we assume the same three-layer
topology considered in [1]. Specifically, we cluster the base
stations in groups of ten, and connect each such group in
a ring; these rings of base stations form the network access
layer. The aggregation layer is formed by k = 6 pods, each
connected to k/2 = 3 rings of base stations. The core layer
consists of k2 = 36 switches connected in full mesh.
Servers and traffic demand: There are |M| = 54 servers,
all with normalized capabilities cM = cC = 1. As in [1], half
of the servers are connected to random switches in the core
layer, half to random switches in the aggregation layer.
Traffic originating from base stations belonging to the mo-
bile operator is processed through the policy graph of Fig. 3(a),
which is similar to the processing done in today’s LTE-based
mobile networks. The traffic volumes on edges refer to five
example base stations in our topology. Traffic from content
providers’ base stations is processed through the policy graph
depicted Fig. 3(b), which includes several different VNFs for
custom processing, inspired by [1], [14]. All VNFs have CPU
and memory requirements randomly set between 0 and 1.
Content provider topology and demand: We use the
topology of the second operator in our dataset to construct
the content provider’s network, albeit with some more manip-
ulations. Specifically, we reduce the number of base stations,
only keeping the 10% most loaded, which are sufficient to
cover 20% of the population. This is consistent with the
widespread belief that content providers will concentrate their
coverage in the most crowded areas, instead of attempting to
directly serve all their users [8].
The traffic demand follows the temporal evolution reported
in [16] for Facebook. The traffic is proportional to the popu-
lation served by each base station, and represents a fraction δ
of the operator’s demand. Unless otherwise specified, we
use δ = 0.5, consistent with the recent news that Netflix
accounts for over one third of the total Internet traffic [18].
Each of the content provider’s base stations is connected to
both the cloud provider and the closest base station belonging
to the mobile operator; such a link enables the two parties to
cooperate. For simplicity, we assume that the content provider
does not deploy any physical server of its own.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Optimal decisions
We first tackle the question what is the most the mobile
operators and content providers can save by switching from a
pure competition relationship to a coopetition. Thus, we have
optimally solved the problem presented in Section II using
CPLEX. Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) compare the opportunistic
and cooperative scenarios and show that the savings mentioned
above are signficant. Specifically, the red areas in the figures
represent the traffic demand of the mobile operator, all of
which is served through its own servers. The blue and yellow
areas correspond to the demand of the content provider:
the blue part is served at the mobile operators’ servers and
the yellow through a third-party cloud vendor. Namely, the
blue area corresponds to fees that should be paid to the
cloud vendor in a pure competition scenario, and are saved
in a coopetition scenario: a limited and defined cooperation
between mobile operators and content providers can allow
them to save 93% on cloud fees if decisions are made jointly,
or 73% if the decisions are opportunistic. We can further notice
that cloud servers are only used during peak times, for at most
41% (58%) of the total load in the cooperative (opportunistic)
scenarios. Fig. 4(c) shows the difference between the two
scenarios is especially significant during peak time, when it is
more likely that the deployment and steering decisions made
by the mobile operator conflict with the needs of the content
provider.
In Fig. 5, we move to the online case, where decisions are
made through the algorithm described in Section III. Fig. 5(a)
shows how the traffic is served; comparing it with Fig. 4(b),
we can immediately see that the yellow area, i.e., the amount
of traffic served at the cloud vendor, is larger. In Fig. 5(b),
the area below the blue curve corresponds to the savings of
our online algorithm which amount to 60% of the cloud fees;
the area between the yellow and the blue curves represents the
savings that would have been possible if decisions were made
optimally but our online algorithm cannot attain.
We also compared the utilization of servers by our online
and optimal algorithm. Specifically, Fig. 6 focuses on the
cooperative scenario and shows that when decisions are made
optimally (Fig. 6(a)) there is more CPU time devoted to the
content provider’s traffic and less idle time than with the
online algorithm (Fig. 6(b)). It is perhaps more interesting
to observe that even when decisions are made optimally, and
even during peak hours, there is a small amount of idle CPU.
This corresponds to servers that have spare CPU, but no spare
memory or network capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Content providers are expected to take part in the creation
of next-generation cellular networks, deploying their own base
stations in those areas that are most significant to them. We
envisioned that the traffic generated therein can be processed
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Fig. 4. Optimal decisions. (a): how the traffic is served in the opportunistic scenario; (b): how the traffic is served in the cooperative scenario; (c): amount
of content provider’s traffic processed at the mobile operator’s servers in both cases.
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Fig. 5. Online decisions, cooperative scenario. (a): how the traffic is served;
(b): amount of content provider’s traffic processed at the mobile operator’s
servers.
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Fig. 6. Cooperative scenario: CPU usage at the mobile operator’s servers.
(a): optimal decisions; (b): online decisions.
with the help of traditional mobile operators, which would
open their SDN-based, virtualized core network to content
providers in exchange for a fee.
In Section II, we modeled the twofold problem of (i) match-
ing virtual network functions and servers and (ii) steering
traffic between them. Moreover, in Section III, we proposed
an online, scalable algorithm to solve such a problem.
We evaluated our performance using the real-world scenario
described in Section IV. As summarized in Section V, we
found that in the optimal case, coopetition between mobile
operators and content providers can allow them to save 93%
on third-party cloud fees when decisions are made jointly and
73% when they are made separately. Our online algorithm is
able to reduce the reliance of the cloud vendor by 60%, while
keeping the computational complexity low.
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